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This paper argues that the pari passu principle of insolvency law does not fulfil any of the functions
often attributed to it. It does not constitute an accurate description of how the assets of insolvent
companies are in fact distributed. It has no role to play in ensuring an orderly winding up of such
companies. Nor does it underlie, explain, or justify distinctive features of the formal insolvency regime,
notably, its collectivity. The case-law said to support the pari passu principle serves actually to
undermine its importance. And the principle has nothing to do with fairness in liquidation. The
substantive argument in the paper concludes by examining the actual role of the principle. The
arguments made here have important implications for almost every debate about insolvency law, from
the status of secured and preferential creditors to the appropriate role of corporate ‘rescue’ procedures.

1. INTRODUCTION

Many a challenge to the different priorities accorded to different types of claim in a company’s
insolvency begins with an incantation of the pari passu principle. Finch states (on the second page of
her encyclopaedic recent study on secured credit): “The normal rule in a corporate insolvency is that all
creditors are treated on an equal footing -- pari passu -- and share in insolvency assets pro rate
according to their pre-insolvency entitlements or the sums they are owed. Security avoids the effects of
pari passu distribution by creating rights that have priority over the claims of unsecured creditors”.1
Bridge sees an inherent tension between the “two fundamental principles of credit and insolvency law”,
that of the freedom of contract which allows one to bargain for priority, and the mandatory pari passu
principle.2 And Cranston, after considering and discounting lesser objections to the existence of secured
credit, concludes that “there are other social policies antipathetical to extensive security, like the pari
passu principle[,] which are less easily refuted”.3
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The pari passu principle is said to be “the foremost principle in the law of insolvency around the
world”.4 Commentators claim to have found this principle entrenched in jurisdictions far removed from
ours in geography and time.5 In English law, statute itself seems to confirm Finch’s “normal rule”, that
all creditors of an insolvent company are to be treated “equally” by having their pre-insolvency claims
abated rate and rate alike.6 The principle is thought to be “all-pervasive”, and its effect is to “strike
down all agreements which have as their object or result the unfair preference of a particular creditor by
removal from the estate on winding up of an asset that would otherwise have been available for the
general body of creditors”.7 The Cork Committee, despite noting significant exceptions to the principle,
reiterated its fundamental importance.8 The principle is said to be supported both by the need for an
orderly liquidation of insolvents’ estates, and by requirements of fairness. So it is not surprising that its
invocation as the starting point for, say, the debate on the priority of secured or preferential claims,
weights the argument in a particular way. Since the pari passu principle has been recognised so widely
and for so long as vital, and since it serves such desirable aims as orderliness in liquidation and fairness
to all creditors, any deviation from it must be a cause for concern. It seem to follow therefore that:
“Before a creditor is entitled to claim a preferred position it must be demonstrated that deviation from
the inveterate and equitable pari passu principle is warranted”.9 On this view, the priority, say, of
secured or preferential claims is an abnormality, a pathology to be diagnosed and controlled, perhaps
even “cured”. Since “equality” is the norm, the onus must be on those supporting differing priorities to
justify their claim. To the extent that their efforts are unpersuasive, the case for priority must be
considered not established, and the “default principle” of “equality” must prevail.10

This paper seeks to overturn this order of things. It is argued here that the pari passu principle is
rather less important than it is sometimes made out to be, and does not fulfil any of the functions often
attributed to it. It does not constitute an accurate description of how the assets of insolvent companies
are in fact distributed. It has no role to play in ensuring an orderly winding up of such companies. Nor
does it underlie, explain, or justify distinctive features of the formal insolvency regime, notably, its
collectivity. The case-law said to support the pari passu principle serves actually to undermine its
importance. And the principle has nothing to do with fairness in liquidation. The paper concludes by
examining the actual role of the principle. If the arguments made here succeed, then the initial onus of
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justifying their position shifts from those arguing in favour of the priority of secured and preferential
creditors etc., to those who support a more “equal” distribution of the insolvent’s estate.11

Since there is confusion in the literature about the correct identification of the pari passu
principle, it would be useful to begin with a word on terminology. The pari passu principle, as it
appears in (corporate) insolvency law, has a fairly specific purpose. It seeks to be informative, to
answer the broad question how insolvency law decides on the treatment of different types of creditor.
The answer offered by this principle is that insolvency law “takes them exactly as it finds them”.12 Put
differently, creditors holding formally similar claims under non-insolvency law are to be paid back the
same proportion of their debt in their debtor’s insolvency.13 The pari passu principle, then, is one
manifestation of formal equality in insolvency law.

However, it is not the only one. As explained in the following Section, insolvency law itself
creates exceptions to the pari passu principle, the most notable for our purposes being that in favour of
preferential creditors. Some of the claims held by the insolvent’s employees, and some tax liabilities
owed by the insolvent, rank ahead of general claims, such that all preferential debts must be discharged
in full before general unsecured creditors are paid anything.14 The factor which causes confusion is that
preferential claims also abate rateably as amongst themselves. Some commentators have therefore been
led to regard the treatment of preferential creditors inter se as another application of the same pari
passu principle.15 But this view is unsound in several different ways. Most obviously, it ignores the
received understanding of the nature of the “equality” principle, that the determination of “equality” is
to be made by pre-insolvency law.16 Second, it reduces the principle to triviality, since the principle
now provides simply that those determined by insolvency law to be equal are to be treated equally by
insolvency law. But now pari passu is not a rule or a restriction or a standard. It neither imposes a
requirement which insolvency law must fulfil, nor does it shape that law in any way. It is merely a
description of what insolvency law actually does, and it fits perfectly with whatever scheme of priorities
that law might devise. As a triviality the principle is harmless, but for the same reason it is also
uninformative. It no longer says anything about why insolvency law chooses to declare certain creditors
11
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to be “equals”. Finally though, and confusingly, the commentators who regard the distribution to
preferential creditors inter se to be governed by the pari passu principle, still accept that the existence
of preferential claims itself constitutes an exception to that principle.17 Viewed thus, their position
becomes something of a paradox: the treatment of preferred claims is both an exception to, and yet an
application of the pari passu rule! Most readers would find it difficult to imagine too many other
situations which both exemplify and contradict one and the same principle.

It is suggested that this view of the “equality” principle, which renders the principle both trivial
and paradoxical, is unhelpful and should be abandoned. A little care with terminology dissolves the
paradox and restores the principle to its roots. A distinction must be drawn between the sort of formal
equality represented by pari passu (the equality of creditors as determined by the pre-insolvency form
of their claim) and other manifestations of formal equality introduced by insolvency law itself (such as
that which holds between some employee- and some Crown-claims, but not between these and claims
held by a trade creditor, say). Accordingly, references to pari passu in this paper are to be understood
in line with this distinction. To break the monotony of recurrence, “the ‘equality’ rule (or principle)”
will sometimes be employed as synonymous with pari passu. Formal equality other than that enshrined
in the pari passu principle will be clearly identified by the context.

2. THE MYTH OF PARI PASSU DISTRIBUTION

Despite the hold exercised by the “equality” principle on the imagination of insolvency lawyers, the
principle is sometimes acknowledged, as a descriptive matter, not to have too much application in the
real world. After proclaiming that the principle is “fundamental and all-pervasive”, Goode adds that
“This, at least, is the theory of insolvency law”.18 Fidelis Oditah, who also regards it as “fundamental”,
explains at the same time that the pari passu norm is “shallow”, since it is subject to numerous
exceptions, and since it does not in itself acknowledge the “obvious truth” that insolvency law often
exempts those holding certain dissimilar pre-insolvency rights from having to submit to an “equal”
distribution.19 The Cork Report noted that rateable distribution among creditors is rarely achieved.20
And Keay and Walton state that the “equality” principle is “nothing more, and has little relevance, other
than to act as a convenient default principle”.21

It would be instructive to consider just how extensive these deviations from the “normal rule”
really are. Disregard for the moment the priority given to those with a consensual property right. Goode
explains that the treatment of secured creditors, suppliers of goods under reservation of title (ROT)
clauses, and “creditors for whom the [debtor] company holds assets on trust”, all are not to be
17
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considered true exceptions to the pari passu principle, since “such assets do not belong to the company
and thus do not fall to be distributed among creditors on any basis”.22 Some five categories of “true
exceptions” established by statute can still be identified.23

First are rights of insolvency set-off, which are wider in effect than those available outside
insolvency. Set-off applies whenever there have been mutual credits, mutual debits or other mutual
dealings, before the onset of liquidation, between the debtor and any of its creditors.24 The cross-claims
need not impeach the debt owed to the insolvent, so long as the requirement of mutuality is satisfied.25
“The right of set-off on insolvency represents a major incursion into the pari passu principle”, since to
the extent that there are mutual credits, debits or other dealings, the creditor able to assert set-off rights
gets a pro tanto priority over others.26 What is especially significant given our focus, this priority is
mandated by the Legislature,27 and operates automatically at the date of the winding-up order without
the need for any intervention by either party.28 Parties, in other words, are compelled to breach the pari
passu principle.

Second, creditors whose claims arise after the winding-up order has been handed down are given
a privileged position. Statute provides that their claims are to be treated as part of the expenses of
liquidation, are therefore to be given “pre-preferential” status (i.e. ranking ahead of preferential
creditors), and are to be paid, not proved.29 In additions, utility suppliers “may make it a condition of
the giving of the supply that the [liquidator] personally guarantees the payment of any charges in
respect of the supply”.30

A third and related category is constituted by pre-liquidation creditors who can compel payment
by virtue of their ability to inflict certain types of harm on the insolvent estate. This category covers
payments to avoid forfeiture of a lease, distress or termination of a contract.31 In general, creditors
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whose continued co-operation is desired by the liquidator may be able to extract payments in respect of
pre-insolvency debts.32

Then there are preferential claims themselves. These include various taxes collected by the
debtor on behalf of the Crown, including some PAYE deductions, unpaid VAT, unpaid car tax, general
betting, bingo, and gaming licence duties, some pool betting duties, and unpaid social security
contributions.33 Levies on coal and steel production, beer duty, lottery duty, insurance premium tax, air
passenger duty and landfill tax have also been added to this list.34 Then there are certain debts related to
the insolvent’s employees. These include any sums in relation to occupational pension schemes,
remuneration of employees up to £800, accrued holiday pay, and any sums loaned and used for the
specific purpose of paying employees’ remuneration.35

Finally, various types of debt have been deferred by statute. These include debts owed by the
insolvent to a director (including shadow director) found liable for wrongful or fraudulent trading, and
ordered to be deferred by the court.36 Claims held by the debtor’s shareholders or other members qua
members also fall under this head.37

So the claims of creditors able to assert set-off, utility companies, post-liquidation creditors, preliquidation creditors with post-insolvency leverage, nineteen different types of preferential claims, and
claims of deferred creditors, all fall outside the purview of the pari passu principle. And even these
“deviations” from the “normal rule”, while patently substantial, might in fact be “something of a minor
qualification” to the “equality” norm.38 There are numerous other types of creditor not affected by it.
Under certain circumstances, this includes claims held by accountants, solicitors, stockbrokers, factors
and bankers, all of whom might be able to benefit from common law liens which arise by operation of
law.39 Statute gives the unpaid seller a lien on the goods sold, and rights of stoppage in transit.40 If the
insolvent was insured, a party injured by its actions (a tort creditor) is subrogated to its rights against
the insurer.41 If the liability in question arose under circumstances governed by the Road Traffic Act
1988, the insurer might be liable to the tort creditor even in those circumstances where it would have
been able to avoid or cancel the policy as against the insured.42 This of course continues to disregard
those able to assert consensual property rights in some assets ostensibly within the insolvent’s estate.

32
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Consider these principles in the light of recent data on the sources of external funding for small
to medium sized enterprises (SMEs),43 which provide insolvency law with most of its business.44 In a
survey covering the period 1995-1997, 47 per cent of this was found to have been provided by banks
(who often take security), 27 per cent by hire purchase/leasing firms (proprietary rights), six per cent by
partners and shareholders (may or may not be deferred by statute), six per cent by factoring businesses
(liens and consensual proprietary rights), four per cent by other individuals, four per cent by other
sources, three per cent by venture capitalists (equity claimants, hence ranking below debtors), and one
per cent by trade customers (who have the option of setting up Kayford trusts45). Also important,
especially for small businesses, is trade credit. By some estimates, stocks and flows of trade credit are
twice the size of bank credit.46 At least some (perhaps much) of the credit in this category also generally
falls beyond the application of the “equality” norm. One survey (which, because of its age, probably
underestimates the extent to which ROT’s are employed) found that well over half the suppliers
surveyed (59%) used ROT clauses.47 This figure seems to rise dramatically, the more troubled the
debtor in question.48

These are of course the sources from which firms raise capital while they are solvent. These
figures do not directly indicate the composition of the overall debt of firms which are in financial
distress, or which are undergoing some formal insolvency procedure. Intuitively, however, it would be
surprising if the debt outstanding when a firm became distressed generally had a structure very different
from the one mentioned above. And in fact there is some fresh data which confirms this intuition. Julian
Franks and Oren Sussman have recently compiled a data set of more than 500 firms which had bank
debt, and which were in financial distress.49 This confirms that the structure of debt of the firms in the
“rescue units” of the three banks studied is very similar to that for solvent firms as a whole.50
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Even more significant is the fact that, in an overwhelming majority of formal insolvency
proceedings, nothing is distributed to general unsecured creditors (the only category of claimant truly
subject to the pari passu rule). It is estimated that there are zero returns to them in 88% of
administrative receiverships, 75% of creditors’ voluntary liquidations, and 78% of compulsory
liquidations. On average, they receive 7% of what they are owed.51

So while the matter is an empirical one, and while the position would of course vary from debtor
to insolvent debtor, the discussion so far and these statistics show that most types of claim either are or
can be exempted from the application of the pari passu principle. It is also likely that in most if not all
liquidations, hardly any claimant is paid pari passu. Given these reasonable deductions, one might
perhaps be forgiven for questioning whether it is fair to describe the pari passu principle as “the normal
rule in a corporate insolvency”.52 In fact, it is the differing priorities of claims which seem to represent
the rule. What seems certain is that, in the distribution of the assets of insolvent estates, “equality”
between different types of claim must be very much the exception. Put differently, even if unsecured
claims other than preferential claims form the bulk of the claims in most liquidations, most of the
available assets would not be distributed “equally”. The pari passu rule is supposed to govern
distributions. It should be obvious, however, that distribution in accordance with this rule is virtually
non-existent.53

Some readers would object that the discussion so far does little more than state the obvious,
since everyone knows the current law leaves little room for anything to be distributed pari passu in an
overwhelming proportion of insolvencies. These readers dramatically underestimate the extent to which
insolvency scholarship still clings to the pari passu myth. Leading insolvency scholars (and courts)
regularly assert that this jurisdiction has a “pari passu insolvency regime”, that the “equality” rule has
been varied “only slightly... in respect of personal claimants”, that the “present law... is disinclined to
force particular classes of creditors to shoulder greater burdens” than others by causing derogations
from the “equality” principle in favour of the latter (or against the former).54 With respect, such
assertions very misleadingly push the pari passu principle to the fore as currently the dominant method
for the distribution of insolvent estates. They are then used as premises in further analysis which in turn
is often (not always) distorted as a result. That is to be regretted. Much of science could not progress till
“Owner”-Directors 6.1%, 2.5%, 2.4%; see ibid., p. 8, Table 3. More on this in the penultimate Section
of this paper.
51
ABRP, Survey, p. 18. This is supported by the Franks-Sussman data, which shows that the median
recovery rate for unsecured creditors in a sample of 27 administrative receiverships is 0%; see Cycle, p.
14, Table 9, n. 1.
52
To this author, ‘normal’ indicates a state of affairs which is usual, regular, common, average, or
typical.
53
The implications of this distinction between the constitution of claims and the pattern of distribution
is discussed further in Section 6 of this paper.
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it had rejected the false geocentric picture of the cosmos. In its rather more modest sphere, insolvency
scholarship must somehow tear itself away from the equally false view that the “equality” principle
occupies the centre of the insolvency law universe.

Still, let us take seriously the objection noted above. Perhaps the discussion so far has missed
the point. The claim that priority is a pathology might not be a descriptive one after all. Those making it
might, on reflection, be willing to concede that the pari passu principle reflects little of reality, which
(they might come to accept) consists of widely divergent priorities accorded to different types of claim.
The critics of differential priority might now argue the “equality” norm constitutes the ideal against
which our existing insolvency law must be judged, since it enshrines desirable goals that any reasonable
insolvency regime must attain. Deviations from pari passu are to be condemned for making the
attainment of those goals more unlikely, and they are to be condemned even more precisely because
they are so widespread. It is to this claim that we now turn.

3. THE IMMUNITY/PRIORITY FALLACY

For English lawyers, it seems the primary attraction of the pari passu principle is its ability to provide
for an orderly liquidation. Goode makes the point firmly:

It is this principle of rateable distribution which marks off the rights of creditors in a winding up
from their pre-liquidation entitlements. Prior to winding up each creditor is free to pursue
whatever enforcement measures are open to him... The rule here, in the absence of an insolvency
proceeding, is that the race goes to the swiftest... Liquidation puts an end to the race. The
principle first come first served gives way to that of orderly realisation of assets by the liquidator
for the benefit of all unsecured creditors and distribution of the net proceeds pari passu.55

Keay and Walton see the principle as the embodiment of similar virtues:

the whole idea of pari passu distribution is to ensure parity of benefit, no matter what resources
one has -- if there were no pari passu distribution we would return to the ‘first come, first
served’ policy of mediaeval times, which saw those with the greatest resources and power taking
the debtor’s estate.56

54

These quotations are from Finch and Worthington, “The pari passu principle and ranking of
restitutionary rights”, in Rose (ed.), Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield, Oxford, 2000), 1, pp. 14-15,
2 and 7, including fn. 33 (emphases added).
55
Insolvency, p. 142.
56
Keay and Walton, “Preferential debts”, p. 95; see also pp. 92-93. Bridge also regards the “equality”
principle as reflecting the law’s interest in an orderly liquidation; see “Quistclose”, p.340, though he
strikes a note of scepticism on the same page: just how “fundamental” could the principle be “when one
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And for Finch, the “equality” principle “conduces to an orderly, collective means of dealing with
unsecured creditor claims and... involves lower distributional costs than alternative processes such as
‘first come, first served’”.57 For these commentators, the choice is clearly between a free-for-all where
weak creditors would inevitably be beaten into last place by better-resourced competitors, and where
the advantages associated with an orderly liquidation would be lost, and the pari passu principle which
alone stands as a bulwark against this.

What is more, and even given its less than universal efficacy, the pari passu principle, it is said,
“retains some practical importance, if only in a negative sense, in that it may have the effect of
invalidating pre-liquidation transactions by which a creditor hopes to secure an advantage over his
competitors”.58 The principle is widely seen to be “very much at the heart of the rationale for the
avoidance of pre-liquidation transactions”.59 Oditah notes that “In one sense, avoiding powers provide
illustrations of insolvency law’s commitment to the principle of equality”.60 And Goode observes that
“the principle of equity among creditors which underlies the pari passu rule of insolvency law will in
certain conditions require the adjustment of concluded transactions which but for the winding-up of the
company would have remained binding on the company”.61

Given that the pari passu principle lies at the very heart of the orderly liquidation regime, and
given its role in justifying some of the most distinctive and well-established aspects of insolvency law
(its preference and other avoidance provisions), any deviations from it must naturally be considered
odious at least prima facie. “Equality” of treatment serves key practical and justificatory purposes
which bring social benefits; so differential priority, its opposite, must result in a diminution of all those
benefits. Those defending the priority, say, of secured claims must therefore bear a heavy burden of
proof.

It is submitted that these arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
liquidation regime. All these arguments commit what will be referred to as the immunity/priority
fallacy. Once that fallacy is exposed and exploded, the rationales given by those supporting the pari

[must] look... for it in the Insolvency Rules and not in the body of the [Insolvency] Act itself[?]”
(footnote omitted).
57
Finch, “Pari passu”, p. 194, noting a “traditional justification” for the principle. See also Finch and
Worthington, “Pari passu”, pp. 2-3.
58
Insolvency, p. 144.
59
Keay and Walton, “Preferential debts”, p. 93 fn. 74, citing Keay, Avoidance Provisions in Insolvency
Law (Sydney, LBC Information Services, 1997), 40-49.
60
“Assets”, p. 465.
61
Insolvency, p. 344; see also pp. 345-348, where the link between the avoidance provisions of the
Insolvency Act and insolvency law’s “equality” principle is reiterated, pp. 387, 389-390 (preferences),
and p. 423, which explains the rule against post-petition dispositions by invoking the principle. Goode
does point out, however, that the principle cannot explain certain important nuances of some of these
provisions; see especially p. 347; for a dramatic modification of the claim quoted in the text and the
references above, see p. 441.
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passu principle will be seen to provide no justification for it. And that principle in turn is shown not to
play any role in bolstering the desirable properties of the liquidation regime.
Let us start by understanding the distinction between priority and immunity.62 Recall again the
old image, that of the debtor firm’s estate forming a pool of assets. As the firm approaches the stage
where its assets are insufficient to meet its liabilities,63 and in the absence of a special liquidation
regime, the firm’s creditors have an incentive to rush to enforce their claims. The earlier they can get a
judgment and execute it, the more likely it is they would get paid in full, or at all. The tardy creditor
would find that nothing is left for him, the pool already having been drained of all its contents. Further,
and on the eve of insolvency, creditors aware of the firm’s troubles and able to influence its decisions
might try to steal the first drink from the asset pool by getting the debtor to repay them. Their gain is a
collective loss. The ‘first come, first served’ system encourages creditors to engage in duplicative
(hence wasteful) monitoring of their debtor in order not to be left behind in any race to the pool. It adds
uncertainty and therefore decreases the utility of risk-averse creditors. And for the debtor whose assets
are more valuable if disposed of together as a going concern, the individualistic system increases the
possibility that those assets would be broken up nonetheless and sold piecemeal to satisfy claims as they
arise.64 It is this value-destroying activity that the dedicated liquidation regime must prevent. Notice the
cause of all the trouble: each creditor faces the necessity, and has the ability, to act individually, in
disregard of the interests of all others. Hence the obvious solution: the dedicated liquidation regime is
collective, decisions being taken on behalf of all those interested in the asset pool.

The analogy and the insight can be taken further. The individualistic pre-insolvency debtcollection regime is a mad race to the asset pool. Since that race is undesirable, the collective
insolvency system steps in to stop it. The creditors are now forced to queue up to have access to the
pool. Voidable preferences and post-petition dispositions of assets etc. can now be seen as attempts by
some creditors to bypass this queue. In other words, they represent efforts to gain immunity from the
collective system. Insolvency law deploys various mechanisms to deny them this immunity.65 So long as
there is no race to the pool, no one succeeds in stealing a drink from it, and creditors await their turn to
have access to the debtor’s resources, decisions can be made systematically and in the common interest.
Crucially, though, note that ensuring that creditors take their place in the queue is one thing. The order
in which they line up is, in general, quite another. Each creditor’s priority is their place in the queue
relative to each other creditor. But espousing the aim that creditors all line up does not entail any
62

See Mokal, “The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain, and Corporate
Liquidation” [2001] Legal Studies (August): “[P]arties in the choice position accept a distinction that
will be referred to as that between immunity and priority”. For the ancestry of this distinction, see
Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Security Interests in Personal
Property (Mineola, NY, Foundation Press, 1987), 67 (discussing the “property right” and the “priority
right” of secured creditors).
63
IA, s. 123.
64
See e.g. Thomas Jackson, “Bankruptcy, nonbankruptcy entitlements, and the creditors’ bargain”
(1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857, and Mokal, “Authentic Consent”.
65
For example, IA, ss. 239 (preferences) and 127 (post-petition dispositions).
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particular order in which they should line up. It does not commit the system to placing all creditors (as
it were) unidistant from the asset pool. The pari passu principle would put each (“similar”) creditor side
by side rather than, say, one after the other. But this arrangement is not a necessary concomitant to the
absence of the value-destroying race. So long as there is a queue (with creditors standing side by side,
one after the other, or in whatever order), there is no race.

Consider now the various comments noted at the beginning of this Section. It can be seen that
they represent the immunity/priority fallacy. This can be defined as attribution of the benefits resulting
from the absence of immunity from a collective insolvency system, to an imaginary and irrelevant state
of equal priority (the realm of pari passu). If the pre-insolvency ‘first come, first served’ system is
objectionable in a firm’s insolvency, it is so because of the monitoring, uncertainty, administrative, and
loss of synergetic value costs described above. All these costs result from an individualistic regime, and
all of them are avoided by a collective one. As long as all those creditors whose actions would inflict
those costs participate in the collective regime or submit to collective decision-making, how their
claims are ranked relative to each other within the collective scheme of distribution is (for these
purposes) irrelevant.66

Similarly, if certain attempts to gain preference are undesirable, that is because they undermine
the benefits associated with collective decision-making. Consider the following situation. In the
liquidation of a particular company, there is only one general unsecured creditor (say a trade creditor
without the benefit of an effective ROT clause) and one preferential creditor (the Crown). Suppose the
former engineers a (voidable) preference in his favour, so that both he and the preferential creditor
finally get back the same proportion of their debts.67 Now the situation here simply cannot be
objectionable on the basis that the pari passu rule has been breached. In fact, the outcome would
probably be perfectly in accord with this rule, since the general creditor is likely to hold the same sort
of non-insolvency claim as the preferential one. So if the rule applies, he should get back the same
proportion of his debt as the latter. However, the voidable preference provisions have been violated
nevertheless. So the pari passu principle does not underlie these provisions, at least as they apply here.
If this much is accepted, then the argument can be pressed further. It would not help to suggest that the
principle justifies the preference avoidance provisions as they apply to a trade creditor who has been
paid a greater proportion of his debt than another, say, but not when they apply to a trade creditor and
66

The reader would have noted the italicised qualification as significant. Without entering into the
debate about its justifiability here, it should be pointed out that secured creditors, for example, acquire
both priority and immunity in their debtor’s insolvency. See Re David Lloyd & Co. (1877) 6 Ch.D. 339,
344-345, per James LJ: “[The insolvency rules which deprive unsecured creditors of the ability
individually to proceed against their debtor] were intended, not for the purpose of harassing, or
impeding, or injuring third persons, but for the purpose of preserving the limited assets of the
company... in the best way for distribution among all persons who have claims upon them... But that has
really nothing to do with the case of the man who for present purposes is to be considered as entirely
outside the company, who is merely seeking to enforce a claim, not against the company, but to his own
property... Why a mortgagee should be prevented from doing that I cannot understand”.
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an employee who both get the same proportion of what they are owed. To advocate this position would
again be to create something of a paradox: that the need to provide ‘equal’ treatment legitimates the
avoidance of a preference in the first situation, but actually providing such treatment constitutes the
objectionable preference in the latter!

In fact, to understand the basis of the preference avoidance provisions, we must switch to the
perspective suggested above. The party given the voidable preference has been allowed to leave the
place assigned to him by the insolvency system. He has been allowed to skip the queue for the
insolvent’s assets. This is the factor which creates the preference.68 This example should make it clear
pari passu is not simply irrelevant to understanding the preference (and several other) avoidance
provisions. In fact, the focus on the “equality” principle can be positively misleading in this regard.69

4. THE PARI PASSU PRINCIPLE IN ACTION?

It is to be noted that the argument here is not one for a change in the law, for example to abolish the
pari passu rule. The point is rather that the alleged manifestations of the principle are nothing of the
sort. The law as it stands today is better understood by adopting the analysis in the previous Section.
That the veneration of the pari passu principle is false becomes clear when one examines the case-law
said to support it. It must be emphasised that the only purpose of discussing these decisions is to show
that reliance on them in support of the pari passu principle is misguided. It should be noted also that the
order in which these cases are discussed is thematic, not historical.
Goode seems to cite Ex parte Mackay70 as authority for the proposition that “The pari passu rule
may not be excluded by contract”.71 In this case, A and B entered into an agreement for A to sell a
67

This contravenes the rule that general unsecured creditors are to be paid nothing until all preferential
debts have been fully honoured; see IA, s. 175.
68
David Milman and Rebecca Parry “Challenging transactional integrity on insolvency: An evaluation
of the new law” (1997) 48 Northern Ireland L.Q. 24, 25-26, perhaps come closest to the view expressed
here. See also Worsley v Demattos (1758) 1 Burr. 467; 97 ER 407, 412, per Lord Mansfield, who
seems to regard as distinct two types of violation of bankruptcy law which result from a voidable
preference. The creditor accorded such a preference gains immunity from the management decisions
taken in the collective interests of all creditors by the trustee, and in addition, escapes having to
participate in the rateable distribution of the estate.
69
For the “policy of section 127” of IA, which provides for the avoidance of post-petition dispositions
of assets, see Lightman J. in Coutts & Co. v Stock [2000]1 W.L.R. 906, 909 (and approved by the Court
of Appeal in Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd. v Bank of Ireland [2001] 2 W.L.R. 290, 296): the provision is
“part of the statutory scheme designed to prevent the directors of a company, when liquidation is
imminent, from disposing of the company’s assets to the prejudice of its creditors and to preserve those
assets for the benefit of the general body of creditors”. Again, the focus is clearly on the preservation of
the insolvent’s estate with a view to its eventual distribution under the statutory scheme of distribution;
needless to say, whether that distribution should be “equal” or otherwise simply is not implicated in the
policy of this section.
70
(1873) 8 Ch. App. 643.
71
Insolvency, p. 144. Goode’s position is not unambiguous, since his argument on this point is rather
brief, and is heavily qualified later on in the text. See also Oditah, “Assets”, p. 464 and the text
accompanying fn. 37, who uses ex p. Mackay to similar effect.
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patent to B. B promised in return to pay over to A the royalties received, and, in addition, lent A
£12,500. It was also agreed that, for satisfaction of this debt, B would have a lien over one-half of the
royalties received, except if A became bankrupt, in which case B might retain all the royalties. A
became bankrupt. It was held on appeal that the provision allowing for B to have additional security in
the event of A’s bankruptcy was void as being a fraud on the bankruptcy laws.72 Goode quotes the
following parts of the judgment in support of the inexcludibility of the pari passu rule:

...a man is not allowed, by stipulation with a creditor, to provide for a different distribution of his
effects in the event of bankruptcy from that which the law provides.73

...a person cannot make it a part of his contract that, in the event of his bankruptcy, he is then to
get some additional advantage which prevents the property being distributed under the
bankruptcy laws.74

But neither of these dicta (nor any other portion of the judgments) make any reference to the pari passu
principle. What they do indicate is, simply, that the bankrupt’s property is not to be distributed except
under the rules of the bankruptcy system. Crucially, a creditor cannot, even ex ante, “get some
additional advantage” in any way not itself allowed by that system. To resort to the analogy introduced
above, he may not skip his assigned place in the queue, whatever that place might be. The decision
provides absolutely no support for the very different proposition that under the liquidation system, the
places assigned to creditors are all unidistant from the asset pool.75 Quite the reverse is in fact true. We
must remember that pari passu was almost as rare in practice at the time of this judgment as it is now.
The decision must be seen against the background of a system which (for example) gave extensive
preferences to the Crown, including those provided by s. 32 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. The Crown
also had statutory liens over various types of property by virtue of the different Excise Acts. And the
Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 32, had enhanced the pre-existing preference for certain debts owed to the

72

See 8 Ch. App. 643, 648, per Mellish L.J.
James L.J. at p. 647 (emphasis added) (the same judge whose dictum concerning secured creditors
was reproduced above).
74
Mellish L.J., at p. 648 (emphasis added).
75
That is the proposition it would have to endorse if it were supporting the “equality” principle. See
also the only authority referred to in the judgment, Higinbotham v Holme (1812) 19 Ves.Jun. 88; 34
E.R. 451, which was directly applied by Mellish L.J. (at 647-648). Here, a marriage settlement
provided that in case the husband, having previously been educated for orders, should enter into trade
and become bankrupt, his life interest would determine. The husband later entered into trade as a cotton
manufacturer, and eventually became bankrupt. Lord Eldon L.C. struck down the relevant clauses of the
marriage settlement as a fraud on the bankrupt laws (p. 453). There can be no doubt that “equality” of
distribution simply was not at issue. The only objection was clearly to the attempt to evade the disposal
of the bankrupt’s property by way of collective proceedings for his creditors’ benefit (pp. 452-453).
Thanks to John Armour for emphasising to the author the relevance of this decision.
73
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bankrupt’s servants and clerks.76 In addition, the Bankruptcy Act 1969, s. 39, provided for mandatory
set-off in bankruptcy in the appropriate circumstances.77

It should be clear distribution according to the bankruptcy laws was not distribution pari passu.
The bankruptcy laws did not place all creditors side by side. The “equality” principle was part of that
regime, but it was by no means the only part (it might not even have been the most important one). In
addition, of course, on the facts of this case, the priority provided to B by way of the lien over one-half
of the royalties was upheld as perfectly proper by the same judgment.78 So, to cite ex parte Mackay as
an authority supporting only equal distribution is, with respect, quite wrong, since it is at least as much
an authority for the prior inexcludibility of unequal treatment of claims, also provided for by the same
laws. The only proposition this decision can be said to support is that one may not bargain for immunity
from the collective bankruptcy regime (except as provided by the law).79

The sceptical reader should turn to National Westminster Bank Ltd. v Halesowen Presswork and
Assemblies Ltd.80 The House of Lords held (by a majority of three to one) that since the regime for the
administration of insolvent estates embodies important elements of public policy, and since the rights of
insolvency set-off form part of that regime, the creditor given such set-off rights cannot contract out of
them. This despite the fact that the agreement which precluded insolvency set-off, and which was struck
down by their Lordships, seemed specifically to have been concluded (inter alia) to ensure that “certain
large payments which were due to the [now-insolvent] company should be available for distribution pro
rata amongst its creditors”.81 The liquidator’s view -- that the party now asserting set-off should be “in
no better position than any other creditor” in the debtor company’s insolvency -- was noted,82 but
rejected.

76

See Keay and Walton’s summary of the history of “Preferential debts”, pp. 86-91.
See Ex p. Barnett, In re Deveze (1874) 9 Ch.App. 293, 295-6, per Lord Selborne L.C. Interestingly,
the other judges in this case, both of whom concurred in the Lord Chancellor’s decision, were Mellish
and James LJJ, the judges who decided Ex p. Mackay. Being aware of this deviation from pari passu
provided by the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (as undoubtedly of the others already mentioned), they could not
possibly be taken to be laying down or upholding some overriding or general rule in favour of “equal”
distribution in Ex p. Mackay (especially since any such rule gets not a single mention in either
judgment). On insolvency set-off, see the discussion in the text, below.
78
See e.g. James L.J., at p. 647.
79
An identical analysis applies to Ex p. Williams (1877) 7 Ch.D. 138 and Ex p. Jackson (1880) 14
Ch.D. 725. In both cases, the mortgagee’s right to distrain on the chattels upon the mortgaged property
was a clear attempt to grant him immunity from the collective bankruptcy proceedings to which the
mortgagors were subject, to the extent of the value of the chattels distrained upon. See also the similar
case of Re Johns [1928] Ch. 737. All three cases are used by Oditah, “Assets”, p. 464 fn. 37, as
demonstrating the operation of the pari passu principle. For reasons discussed in the text to which this
note is attached, it is submitted that they deal with an entirely different point, with immunity, not
priority.
80
[1972] A.C. 785 (HL).
81
See the submission on behalf of the company, ibid., p. 792A.
82
Expressly so by at least one of their Lordships; see per Viscount Dilhorne, p. 801E.
77
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So an exception to the “equality” principle -- the contractual disapplication of which might have
led to a more “equal” distribution -- is as mandatory as any other part of the liquidation regime. What
cannot be contracted out of (in an unacceptable way) is not the pari passu principle, but the whole
collective system for the winding-up of insolvent estates. Not only is it forbidden for a creditor to leave
his assigned place in the queue and step ahead of others, he cannot even leave his place ahead of others
and stand in line with them. The inequality inherent in the system (in this case by way of insolvency setoff) is every bit as binding as the equality. Note again that the focus is on attempts to frustrate (some of)
the rules of the liquidation regime. Whether that would lead to an increase or decrease in the “equality”
of distribution is simply irrelevant.83
Let us consider British International Air Lines Ltd. v Compagnie Nationale Air France.84 British
Eagle (BE) was a member of a clearing house scheme operated by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA). Sums due from participating airlines to each other were netted off at the end of
every month. Those with a net credit balance would then receive a payment from the clearing house,
while those with a net debit balance were required to pay into the system. BE having gone into
liquidation, it was found that it owed money to several airlines, but had a claim against Air France (AF).
A bare majority of their Lordships allowed the liquidator to recover that sum on the basis that the
netting arrangements contravened the pari passu principle. The Lords rejected AF’s contention that the
liquidator’s only claim lay against the clearing house, and that it could only be for the amount (if any)
which remained to BE’s credit after the netting-off. According to the majority, the netting arrangements
captured for the benefit of the members of the clearing house an asset (the claim against AF) which, but
for those arrangements, would have been available for distribution among BE’s general creditors.

That this case has been described as “[undoubtedly the] leading modern authority on the preeminence of the pari passu principle”85 is not without irony. The case could not provide any support for
the pari passu principle. Recall that this principle supposedly requires “equals” to be treated equally.86
And the determination of “equality” is generally left to non-insolvency law:

The Act of Parliament unquestionably says that everybody shall be paid pari passu, but that
means everybody after the winding up has commenced. It does not mean that the Court shall
look into past transactions, and equalise all the creditors... It takes them exactly as it finds
them.87
83

To similar effect, see e.g. Ex p. Barnett, In re Deveze (1874) 9 Ch.App. 293.
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 758 (HL). For criticism of the decision, see the Cork Report, paras. 1341-1342.
85
Oditah, “Assets”, p. 465; it must be emphasised that Oditah himself is unimpressed by the decision
and subjects it to cogent criticism; see p. 466.
86
The rule that all those who correctly answer x number of questions in an exam are to get x marks,
enshrines one type of equality. The rule that all those who take the exam are to get x marks represents
quite another. The pari passu principle is traditionally conceived as analogous to the former rather than
the latter rule.
87
Re Smith, Knight & Co., ex p. Ashbury (1868) L.R. 5 Eq. 223, 226, per Lord Romilly M.R. See also
Oditah, “Assets”, pp. 463 and 468.
84
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But even Lord Cross, speaking for the majority, accepted that AF, and other members of the clearing
house, were never equal to BE’s general creditors outside liquidation.88 During BE’s solvency, the
members of IATA could not (unlike BE’s non-IATA creditors) just have ignored the clearing house
arrangements and sued BE for any sums owed. Correspondingly, BE could not, while solvent, have
proceeded directly against AF. It could only have claimed against the clearing house for any net balance
due to it.89 And yet BE’s liquidator was allowed to do precisely what BE would not have been able to
do. By the same stroke, BE’s IATA creditors were forced to claim directly against BE (by proving in its
liquidation) while they would have been neither required nor even allowed to do so before the
commencement of its winding-up. Pre-insolvency unequals were forcibly “equalised” in insolvency.
This hardly constitutes a vindication of the pari passu principle, no matter what the judicial rhetoric.
And in any case, the sums recovered as a result of this decision would not have been distributed pari
passu. Pre-preferential and preferential creditors etc. would have taken the first bite.90

Perhaps a better way of understanding the disputed issues in British Eagle would be to look at
the netting arrangements simply as an attempt on part of IATA to prevent its members from having to
submit to the collective liquidation regime. Or at least this is how they seem to have been viewed by the
majority of their Lordships.91 That such contracting-out (i.e. immunity) was not objectionable per se
was also accepted. Lord Cross implied that, had the IATA arrangements created charges in favour of
the IATA creditors with effects equivalent to the disputed netting scheme, those would have been
effective against the liquidator if duly registered.92 So the objection was not to the granting of immunity
to only some of BE’s creditors (or indeed to granting them priority over others). Rather, the majority
were of the view that the advantages associated with recognising this novel way of acquiring immunity
were not sufficient to outweigh (what they saw as) the costs of such a significant derogation from the
88

[1975] 1 W.L.R. 758, 777C-H; to the same effect, see Lord Morris (dissenting), pp. 764F, 765A and
765E; and Lord Simon (dissenting), p. 771F-H.
89
Ibid., p. 777C-D (per Lord Cross).
90
This point is impliedly noted ibid., at pp. 761B (Lord Morris) and 778H (Lord Cross). And needless
to say, had there been a floating charge over the relevant assets, its holder would have been repaid in
preference to general unsecured creditors. The same point again seems to have been missed by the
Court of Appeal in In re Celtic Extraction Ltd. (in liq.) [2000] 2 W.L.R. 991, 1005D, where Morrit L.J.
(delivering the Court’s judgment), invoked “the very considerable... public policy requirement that the
property of insolvents should be divided equally amongst their unsecured creditors”, to uphold the
official receiver’s ability to disclaim a waste disposal licence as onerous property. The Court’s
assertion, that any assets preserved by the disclaimer would be distributed pari passu amongst general
creditors, is of course without foundation. Any such assets (on the facts, there were none) would mostly
go to any floating charge holder and to pre-preferential and preferential creditors.
91
Ibid., p. 780G-H: “[What Air France] are saying here is that the parties to the ‘clearing house’
arrangements by agreeing that simple contract duties are to be satisfied in a particular way have
succeeded in ‘contracting out’ of the provisions contained in section 302 for the payment of unsecured
debts ‘pari passu.’” Note the unnecessary (and inaccurate) emphasis on “equality” at the end of this
quotation: what would have been contracted out of was the whole collective regime, its inequality (e.g.
in favour of pre-preferential and preferential creditors) as well as its “equality”.
92
Ibid., p. 780C. The existence of such charges would of course accord priority over BE’s general
creditors to IATA creditors, as well as granting the latter immunity from the collective liquidation
regime.
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collective regime.93 This conceptualisation of the majority’s decision then also allows one to make
sense of the strong dissenting speech by Lord Morris, who emphasised the benefits which flowed from
having the netting arrangements.94 On the arguments made here, the thrust of the dissenting speeches
would of course have to be that these benefits (of allowing the arrangements to prevail) would outweigh
any associated costs.

Unfortunately, though, there seems to have been no suggestion in the arguments that the issue
should be regarded thus, as a question of balancing the commercial advantages of recognising this novel
way of gaining immunity from the liquidation regime against any lessening of the advantages associated
with having a collective system. As already mentioned, the latter include the ability to preserve the
going concern surplus if there is one, and the minimisation of uncertainty, monitoring and
administrative costs. The IATA netting system should have been upheld if the costs to the actors
resulting from any increases in uncertainty, monitoring and administrative costs, in the risk that a going
concern surplus would be lost, and in the diminution of the pool of assets entailed by the existence of
immunity for IATA creditors, were outweighed by the benefits it brought to the same actors.95 (Note
that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition, since the initial distribution scheme provided by the
liquidation regime is not self-evidently appropriate and therefore must itself be argued for.) The pari
passu red herring served massively to confuse this issue. In failing to consider it clearly, it is submitted
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Ibid., pp. 780H-781A: “[It] is to my mind irrelevant that the parties to the ‘clearing house’
arrangements had good business reasons for entering into them and did not direct their minds to the
question how the arrangements might be affected by the insolvency of one or more of the parties. Such
a ‘contracting out’ must... be contrary to public policy. The question is, in essence, whether what was
called... the ‘mini liquidation’ flowing from the clearing house arrangements is to yield to or prevail
over the general liquidation. I cannot doubt that on principle the rules of the general liquidation should
prevail”. Despite appearances, the objection to granting immunity from the collective regime was not an
absolute one. As already noted, the judge had implied earlier in the same paragraph that he would have
been content to allow immunity for the IATA creditors by way of security. This also shows the
objection was not one of principle. There was no principle involved which laid down, say, that no one
can bargain for immunity. The matter was rather of policy. One could only bargain for immunity in an
acceptable way (the authority for this is British Eagle itself), and for the right reasons. Even if the
method of attaining immunity was acceptable, the reasons might not. In Ex p. Mackay, the only
discernible reason for the extra security was the desire of the creditor to better his own position in his
debtor’s insolvency. Other creditors suffered harm without receiving any compensating benefit.
94
See e.g. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 758, 761F-G, 762D-763C.
95
That was almost certainly the case; it follows that the IATA scheme should have been upheld.
Parliament seems to have taken a somewhat similar view; see Companies Act 1989, Part VII, which
reversed the effects of the decision with respect to financial markets. The Act creates yet another
exception (if the British Eagle decision were to be taken at face value) to the “equality” principle. The
recent decision of Neuberger J. in Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock
Exchange and Another (Transcript, 10 July 2001), recognises yet another exception to the principle,
this time concerning property the ownership of which depends on the personal characteristics of the
owner, and further, assets so inextricably linked to such property that they could be considered
“ancillary” to it (see e.g. paras. 110-3). In this case, these were, respectively, the membership of the
London Stock Exchange, and a “‘B’ share” entitling the holder (roughly) to vote on decisions about
how the company which owned the Exchange was to be run, and to participate in the distribution of the
value released because of that company’s demutualisation.
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the British Eagle decision is deeply unsatisfactory.96 Be that as it may, for the reasons discussed, the
leading modern authority on the pre-eminence of the pari passu principle actually stands more for its
hollowness than its hallowedness.
Ex parte Barter; Ex parte Black97 is another interesting decision cited in support of the pari
passu principle.98 X, a Portuguese steamship company, entered into an agreement with Y, who were
shipbuilders. Under the agreement, Y were to build and sell to X a steamship, the price for which was to
be paid in instalments as the construction work progressed. On payment of the first instalment, the
agreement provided that the steamship, its engines, and all associated materials were to be vested in X,
the buyers (the Court of Appeal referred to this as the “vesting clause”). It was also agreed that X would
have the right to seize all these materials if the construction work remained discontinued for a specified
period, or if the ship was not delivered on time, or if Y became insolvent or bankrupt (the “seizure
clause”). Finally, the agreement stipulated that, if any of the events mentioned above should occur, X
would have the right to employ alternative builders to complete the ship, and to use Y’s shipyard,
premises, machinery, plant, tools and any other materials present on Y’s premises suitable to the
purpose (the “user clause”). The work commenced and the first instalment was paid. Subsequently, on
Y’s insolvency, X exercised its rights under the “seizure clause” and took possession of the ship,
engines and related materials. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal: X was merely seizing property
which already belonged to it by virtue of the “vesting clause”.99 However, the “user clause” was struck
down, since “a power upon bankruptcy to control the user after bankruptcy of property vested in the
bankrupt at the date of the bankruptcy is invalid”.100

The Court’s decision is hardly surprising, in view of the extravagance of the terms of the “user
clause” if for no other reason. But in any case the relevant issues are very clear on the facts. We must
note the two most important points. First and yet again, there was no absolute bar to the parties
bargaining for immunity from the collective regime. This was quite obviously the effect of the “vesting”
and “seizure” clauses. Instead of lining up with the rest of Y’s creditors and submitting to the collective
decisions made by Y’s trustee, X was able to remove itself from the queue to the extent of the value of
the materials covered by the two clauses. But second, the “user clause” was an attempt to commandeer
Y’s remaining estate for the sole benefit of X, removing that too from the ambit of the trustee’s
decision-making. This was regarded as unjustifiable. Even as to the “user clause”, X had argued that it
would redound to the general good of all of Y’s creditors, since the completion of the ship would
reduce pro tanto the amount for which X would prove in the bankruptcy for Y’s breach of contract.101
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The Court of Appeal disagreed: in the absence of the clause, the trustee would have decided whether to
complete the ship and claim the contractual price, or to abandon the contract, and this decision would
have been made for the benefit of all of Y’s creditors. But the “user clause” removed the trustee’s
ability to make that choice, and instead vested that choice in X.102 To the extent to which X was a
creditor for damages for Y’s breach of contract, the clause purported to grant X immunity from having
to participate in the collective bankruptcy regime. This attempt to gain immunity was regarded as
unacceptable.

Now whatever one might think of the distinctions made in the Court’s judgment about
acceptable and unacceptable ways of by-passing the collective regime, we should note once again that
the pari passu principle was not at issue. The “user clause” would have by-passed the inequality of the
regime (inherent in the rules governing set-off, pre-preferential and preferential claims etc.) before it
evaded its “equality”. The crucial issue was not X’s place in the queue relative to other creditors but the
fact that he would not have had to queue up at all, and -- if that was not enough -- would have prevented
the trustee being able to make a collective decision about much of the remaining pool of assets.103

The same point can be made again and again. Cases cited in support of the “equality” principle
either support that principle only as part of a significantly “unequal” insolvency regime, or more
frequently, show nothing except the law’s intolerance towards attempts to gain immunity from the
collective liquidation system in unacceptable or unfamiliar ways. In view of all this, the pari passu
principle could not possibly be necessary for there to be an orderly liquidation. In addition to all the
arguments above, to the extent that the current liquidation regime is accepted as fulfilling the
requirements of orderliness and as replacing the value-destroying rush for an insolvent’s assets, and
given that pari passu is a very partial feature of the system, the present liquidation regime itself
constitutes a rebuttal of any such claim.104 What is more, the very significant departure from this
principle represented by insolvency set-off has been regarded at the highest judicial level as itself
necessary for a “proper and orderly” administration of the estates of insolvent companies.105 But then,
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since “equal” treatment of different types of claim is not required to gain the practical advantages
associated with the orderly winding up of insolvent estates, and since it is not necessary to justify
insolvency law’s peculiar features (e.g. its collectivity, and the avoidance of preferences and postpetition dispositions), the existence of differential priority -- including that of secured creditors -cannot be impugned on the ground that it interferes with the attainment of these goals.

Finally and in the interests of completeness, a decision which allows parties to bargain for a
priority different from the one they would have had without that agreement -- but without allowing
immunity from the rules of the liquidation regime -- is Re Maxwell Communications Corporation.106
This case concerned an agreement whereby certain bonds issued by M Ltd. (held by parties referred to
hereafter as “the Bondholders”) were guaranteed by M plc. “on a subordinated basis”. Subsequently, M
Ltd. being insolvent, M plc. was placed in administration. The administrator applied for an order to
exclude the Bondholders from participation in a scheme of arrangement under which, secured and
preferential creditors having been paid, the remainder would be distributed pari passu among M plc.’s
other unsecured creditors. In accordance with the subordination agreement, the Bondholders would
only be paid if these other unsecured creditors were first paid off in full. It was clear on the facts that, if
this scheme was approved, the Bondholders would get nothing.107

It was argued on behalf of the Bondholders that the subordination agreement was void as being
in breach of the pari passu principle: “the liquidator ought not to be required or entitled to look behind
a proof to determine whether a creditor submitting a proof was entitled to payment pari passu with other
unsecured creditors”.108 In effect, the submission was that the pari passu principle should be given
effect with respect to all those general creditors who submitted a proof, the liquidator being required to
turn a blind eye to the pre-insolvency dealings between the debtor and (some of) its creditors. This was
rejected. Vinelott J. pointed out that “[t]here are situations under the Insolvency Act 1986 in which an
unsecured debt is postponed to other unsecured debt”.109 In these situations, the liquidator might well
need to have regard to the pre-insolvency status of different unsecured creditors. So if the liquidator had
no difficulty in determining the pre-insolvency positions of various unsecured creditors and giving
effect to statutory subordination, he would face no greater hurdle in dealing with contractual
subordination.110 The judge read British Eagle as laying down the rule that “a creditor cannot validly
contract with his debtor that he will enjoy some advantage in a bankruptcy or winding-up which is
denied to other creditors”. However, he held that this did not preclude an agreement between A and B
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Ltd. for the latter’s debt to A to be subordinated in B’s insolvency to that owed to B’s other unsecured
creditors.111

This decision should make it clear that the pari passu principle is far from sacrosanct. It is
obvious that Re Maxwell allows parties to avoid it. The Bondholders, who would have ranked pari
passu with M plc.’s other creditors, were relegated because of the terms of their agreement with M plc.
to a position inferior to those other creditors. But this aspect of the decision should not tempt one to the
hasty conclusion that the inexcludibility confirmed by British Eagle “applie[s] only to those rules the
infringement of which would give one creditor an advantage denied to other creditors”.112 Resorting
once again to the analogy of the common pool, this would amount to saying that, the rule is that within
the insolvency regime, one can contract out of one’s assigned place in the queue if the result would be
to benefit the remaining unsecured creditors in the debtor’s insolvency,113 but not if it would make them
worse off. But this interpretation would be quite inconsistent with the House of Lords’ judgment in
Natwest v Halesowen.114 That case shows one is not allowed to change one’s place in the queue for the
pool of the insolvent’s assets simply because that would increase the bankruptcy value to be distributed
to the remaining creditors. As already noted, the Lords there struck down an agreement which, by
altering a creditor’s priority position, would have brought about just such an increase.115

So when should parties be allowed to change their priority position within the collective
liquidation regime, in other words, to alter their relative places in the queue to the pool of the
insolvent’s assets? Only a hint can be provided here. Most obviously, an agreement to alter the priority
position of creditors within the liquidation regime should be allowed when -- for all the creditors whose
priority position in their debtor’s insolvency would be made worse off because of the agreement -- the
expected benefits of the agreement to those same creditors outweigh its expected costs.116 (This again is
a sufficient but not necessary condition, and is discussed further in the next Section.)
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5. FAIRNESS AS “EQUALITY”

We have considered -- and rejected -- the claim that the “equality” principle is essential for the orderly
liquidation of companies, and that it underlies important and distinctive features of the collective
insolvency regime. This Section challenges the other main role often assigned to it. The pari passu
principle requires that all creditors (in positions of relative equality as determined by pre-insolvency
law) should be paid back the same proportion of their debt in their debtor’s liquidation. Since this type
of “equality” represents fairness, runs this argument, the pari passu rule ensures all creditors are treated
fairly. Keay and Walton are of the view that “The underlying aim behind the use of the equality
principle is to produce fairness, so that every creditor is treated in the same way”.117 As noted above,
they argue that to abolish this principle would be to return to the “mediaeval” policy of allowing those
with the greatest resources and power to deprive poorer and weaker creditors of anything in their
debtor’s insolvency.118 This would be normatively unattractive. Several other commentators have
suggested in a similar vein that the “equality” principle enshrines fairness in liquidation.119
The debate about equality as a political ideal is long and complex.120 There is no question, in an
article of this nature, of doing justice (as it were) to the issue of the type of equality, if any, that should
be enshrined in a law -- or the law as a whole -- as representing fairness. This is especially true when, as
here, the notion of ‘fairness as equality’ is only one of several issues to be considered. So the discussion
here will be a summary one. However, it is suggested that even this should suffice, at the very least, to
cast serious doubt on the claim that the pari passu principle conduces to fairness in liquidation.

There can be no doubt that real equality is a -- some would say the only -- form of fairness. But a
set of laws enshrines real equality only when it treats all those subject to it as equals. However, “[t]here
is a difference between treating people equally, with respect to one or another commodity or
117
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opportunity, and treating them as equals”.121 It is this crucial distinction which is universally overlooked
by supporters of the pari passu principle.

Let us distinguish, in a rough and ready way, between formal and real equality. In the relevant
context, formal equality holds when the same rule applies to all people. That everyone must stop at a
red traffic light is an example. This type of equality, while undoubtedly important, results in a fairly
superficial form of fairness, the limits of which are easy to expose. It is not obviously fair to insist that
an ambulance should be obliged to wait at the red signal just like any other vehicle, even though
carrying a seriously ill patient. That access to a building is provided “equally” to all by way of a steep
staircase does not necessarily prevent those using wheelchairs from being treated unfairly. Or think of a
flat-rate income tax: regardless of how much you earn, let us say 25% of your annual income is to be
paid over to the state. Many (perhaps most) readers would intuitively find this method of taxation
normatively unappealing. That you are to be deprived of the same proportion of your income, whether
you earn £10,000 or £10m per annum, would not strike them as particularly fair. Note here the parallel
with the pari passu rule, which represents the decision that all creditors are to be deprived of the same
proportion of their debts, should their debtor become insolvent. The problem is that a rule based on
formal equality does not take into account important differences between people, even though those
differences are relevant to any consideration of the rule’s fairness. Of course equals must be treated as
equals, but who is to be considered equal to whom, and in what respect? Merely formal equality might
resolve these vital questions by reference to trivial, or irrelevant, or meaningless attributes. But for
equality to result in fairness (a morally charged concept), the determination of who constitutes an equal
must be based on characteristics that themselves are morally significant. So a rule based on formal
equality is often empty of normative content. To treat people with only formal equality is frequently not
to treat them as equals.

How do we treat people, then, in order to treat them as equals? One attempt to describe what this
entails in the specific context of corporate insolvency is the Rawlsian framework of the Authentic
Consent Model.122 The Model suggests parties are treated as equals -- and thus fairly -- when their
respective interests are accorded equal care and respect in the selection of insolvency law principles.
Space does not allow a fuller treatment of this Model here. However, the discussion which follows
should be regarded as flowing from the considerations identified as relevant in it, and from the
methodology it enshrines. Let us consider the proposal that in order to ensure fairness in the distribution
of assets in a corporate liquidation, all those who hold a claim which non-insolvency law determines to
be formally similar, are to get back the same proportion of what they are owed. It is suggested that in
this general form, this proposal is unacceptable. The reason is straight-forward. Non-insolvency law
does not need to determine the priority status of different types of creditor, since for most solvent
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debtors, all creditors get everything they are owed.123 For that reason, non-insolvency law makes few
formal distinctions between various types of claimant. The unsecured claim of a bank, a tax liability
owed to the Crown, and the unpaid wages of an unskilled worker, all have the same pre-insolvency
form. Non-insolvency law often does not resolve an issue which is (almost by definition) peculiar to
insolvency itself -- who should bear how much loss when a company is rendered terminally unable to
meet its obligations?124 So when an actor does become insolvent, to seek guidance from non-insolvency
law to determine how different claimants ought to be treated -- as the pari passu principle purports to
do -- is to commit the old formalist error identified above. The “equality” principle determines who
counts as an “equal” by reference to an attribute of the claimants (i.e. the non-insolvency form of their
claim) which is irrelevant or trivial or meaningless as regards the appropriateness of any method of
distribution of an insolvent’s estate.

This point can fruitfully be explored further. Let us isolate the issues of interest to us by making
two assumptions. First, suppose there are only three types of creditor, commercial banks, the Crown,
and the debtor’s employees.125 And second, pretend that the bankrupt’s estate must be allocated without
reference to the parties’ own pre-insolvency interests and commitments.126 Now it is obvious that banks
lend to thousands of companies (or more) and are therefore well-diversified. Banks can balance the
harm of receiving somewhat less in the insolvency of some of their debtors, against the profit they make
from lending to the many more who pay back every penny with interest. By virtue of being repeat
players, they have accumulated expertise in assessing the credit-worthiness of their borrowers. And
since they are strong commercial players in an under-diversified market for the provision of credit,127
they have a strong influence on the terms on which they lend. So bank-creditors are very well-placed to
deal with being paid back less than they are owed in any individual insolvency.

On the other hand, employee-creditors might often be dependent solely on their salaries, might
be unable to diversify by working for more than one employer, might have no insurance because they
are not able to join a trade union which would buy such insurance for its members, might have had no
influence over the terms on which they were employed and therefore became creditors, and might be
unable quickly to find work on being deprived of a job by virtue of their employer’s insolvency.128
Employees might be owed wages for several weeks or months, having supplied services to their
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company while it was in financial distress without demanding payment on time, in the hope that the
company would recover. Such employee-creditors might suffer serious detriment if they lose too great a
proportion of their outstanding debts.

Viewed thus, the suggestion that bank-creditors and employee-creditors should both be treated
“equally” by being paid back the same proportion of what they are owed, seems absurd. That the two
types of creditor hold claims judged under non-insolvency law to be formally similar to each other does
not carry too much weight. To treat these parties as equals in their debtor’s insolvency requires that
those in a more vulnerable position in their debtor’s insolvency be given greater protection than those
better able to deal with the loss. Fairness does not result from treating the two types of creditor
“equally”, so the pari passu principle -- stated broadly as above -- should be rejected outright as applied
to bank- and employee-creditors with claims similar to each other under non-insolvency law. It is
submitted the same reasoning holds mutatis mutandis for the various types of creditor different in this
morally significant way, regardless of the formal legal nature of their claims. So for example, the
principles of distribution resulting from this exercise are more likely to give employee-creditors at least
a degree of priority in their employer’s insolvency over most other types of claimant.129

It should be emphasised that the extent to which creditors are vulnerable to serious harm in their
debtor’s insolvency is only one of several relevant considerations in determining their proper ranking in
corporate liquidation. The point here is not to identify all such factors (or even to defend the
preferential debts regime as it stands today), but rather, to cast doubt on the pari passu principle as the
guardian of fairness in liquidation. It should be obvious its crude “equality” is almost entirely
unattractive if we wish to treat all the parties as equals.

This concludes the argument that the pari passu principle has nothing to do with fairness. But to
leave this discussion at this point would be profoundly misleading. Recall the second assumption made
above, that in choosing principles to govern distribution of an insolvent’s assets, we are unconcerned
about the parties’ pre-insolvency rights and obligations. This assumption allowed us to focus narrowly
on whether “equality” of distribution in corporate liquidation is normatively attractive. But while useful
for that purpose, it is problematic and of course totally counterfactual. Creditors of a firm which
becomes insolvent do not suddenly develop a completely new set of interests without link or connection
with the interests they had before this particular debtor became unable to pay its debts. In their capacity
as actors on the commercial stage, they do not undergo a re-birth which purges them of pre-insolvency
commitments. Their interests and obligations within liquidation flow from their pre-liquidation ones,
and are inextricably linked. So for example, to accept the very existence of claims against the nowinsolvent company is to acknowledge this inseverable link with the pre-insolvency commitments of the
actors. And one of the reasons why employees are more deserving of protection in their employer’s
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insolvency is their pre-insolvency inability to diversify, and (for many employees) to have an
appreciable say about the terms of their employment, etc.

It follows that, while the pre-insolvency form of claims might not matter, the pre-insolvency
interests and obligations of all the parties must always be taken into consideration when deciding about
the priority of certain types of claimant over others. Fairness demands that each claimant be accorded
equal care and concern. But this involves looking at the totality of the interests and obligations of each.
So the principles of insolvency law, though dealing exclusively with peculiar insolvency issues, should
not focus exclusively on the interests of parties once a relevant actor is already insolvent. Rather, they
should affect the parties in a way which pays equal attention to both their pre- and post-insolvency
interests and obligations, conceived of as the continuities that they actually are. So the distributive
principles of insolvency law should uphold any pre-insolvency priority arrangements which, for
example, serve the entirety of the interests of each of them. This despite the fact that those
arrangements do not serve the post-insolvency interests of some of them. One of insolvency law’s more
challenging tasks is therefore to distinguish between pre-insolvency priority arrangements which are
mutually advantageous to all the relevant parties, and those which are merely exploitative. The latter
must of course be ruled out, but it would conduce to fairness actually to give effect to the unequal
distribution resulting from the former.130

6. THE PROPER ROLE OF “EQUALITY”

The argument so far has concentrated on what the pari passu principle in particular, and formal equality
in general, do not do. It would perhaps be useful to add a word here about what in fact their actual role
is. Formal equality operates in three types of situations in liquidation, always for the same reason. First,
let us consider the pari passu principle itself. Commonly understood as governing the claims of general
unsecured creditors, it is submitted that this is not primarily a rule of distribution at all. On the contrary,
it is a rule of non-distribution. The argument here can be broken down into four steps.

First, certain types of claim are considered ‘important’, in the sense that they should be met to a
significant degree in most insolvencies. To ensure this is the case, they are allotted special priority
positions, either by the parties to commercial transactions, or (where the parties cannot be trusted to
reach the right result) by Parliament itself. Second, not to provide a particular priority position for a
type of claim is to ensure it will receive little or nothing in most insolvencies. Third and following from
that, there must still be a fall-back provision which covers the treatment of these latter claims. In view
of the paucity of value to be distributed to those holding such claims, it is especially important that the
implementation of this fall-back provision in individual liquidations should be cost-effective. Finally,
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the conclusion is that the pari passu principle is the ideal fall-back provision. This is the basic structure
of the argument, and it must now be fleshed out.

Let us begin by noting once again that in any formal insolvency proceeding, different claims are
treated according to different priority rules, depending both on who holds those claims, and what sort of
assets the claims are being applied to. Creditors able to assert set-off rights created and mandated by
insolvency law beat all others to the extent of those rights. For assets subject to fixed charges, the
chargee of course ranks first.131 For trade goods supplied under an acceptable ROT provision, the trade
creditor can reclaim them. For goods subject only to a floating charge, post-liquidation claimants rank
ahead of preferential creditors who rank ahead of the floating charge holder, and so on. All these
priority rules are thought to have different rationales. For example, insolvency set-off is said to be
based on consideration of fairness.132 The priority of (some) secured creditors, and of trade creditors
with ROT’s, arguably stems from strong efficiency considerations and is mutually advantageous to
all.133 Post-liquidation creditors are given precedence because they cannot be expected to subsidise preexisting claimants. Preferential creditors are said to be worthy of special treatment because they do not
choose their debtor in any meaningful sense, do not negotiate the terms of their loans, and (in the case
of employees) might be undiversified.134 The list goes on. The different priority rules are all complex. It
takes time, resources and effort for Parliament on the one hand, and debtors and creditors themselves on
the other, to decide what types of claim should rank in what order, with respect to different types of
asset.

Of course, however, the state of insolvency is by definition one where the debtor cannot fulfil all
its obligations. (As already suggested, priority rules are really crucial only against this background of
insolvency.) What we would regard as general unsecured claims, then, are those for which neither
Parliament nor the parties themselves have provided specific rules of distribution. This must be viewed
in the context that generally, only secured, post-liquidation and preferential creditors get anything in
their debtor’s insolvency. There is little or (much more frequently) nothing for those ranking below
them. So the interests regarded as more worthy of attention (and therefore arguably more important) by
the rule-makers (public and private) are given precedence with respect to particular types of asset, in
certain situations, to a specified extent. To decide not to provide for such a priority for a type of claim
is in fact to decide not to have it met at all in most insolvencies. And it is this reasoning which provides
the crucial insight into the true role of the “equality” norm. It was suggested above that pari passu
should not be viewed as a default rule. It cannot accurately be regarded as the starting position,
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departures from which must be explained. Instead, it is now submitted, the rule is best seen as a fallback provision. It is the rule which takes over when it would be pointless to provide any other.

Here is the argument again. Some types of claim are regarded as important, and rules are
provided to govern how they should be dealt with in insolvency. But once this is done, nothing (or not
much) would be left for distribution to other creditors. Recall that most insolvency proceedings (75% of
them or more) yield nothing for general unsecured creditors. And when they do bring some returns, the
yields are fairly small (about 7 pence on the pound on average). So there simply is no point in deciding
how these claims should rank vis-à-vis each other. For such claims to be governed by the pari passu
rule makes very good sense, since the costs in terms of time, effort, and resources required to determine
their appropriate (fair and efficient) rankings would far exceed any benefits. Why waste resources
identifying and laying down different priorities, when it is obvious hardly any assets are likely to be
distributed according to them? For such a situation, in fact, “equal” treatment is ideal. In most
instances, this simply means some types of creditor equally get nothing. In the remaining minority of
insolvencies, the tiny amounts available for distribution are all distributed proportionately, rather than
being wasted in ascertaining the claimants’ correct rankings. The pari passu principle applies, then,
whenever the costs of providing for different rankings for different claims would exceed the benefits.
The claims it governs mostly -- and necessarily -- constitute something approaching a distributively null
set; they are held by those who will not receive anything. If they do receive something, it would not be
much. It is for this reason that the “equality” principle is most accurately regarded as a rule of nondistribution.

Now for the second application of formal equality in corporate liquidation, which lies in the
treatment of the same “type” of claimant. For example, claims of all employees are treated “equally”
and given preferential treatment over most other unsecured creditors. It was argued above that
employees might be more deserving of protection in their employer’s insolvency than other types of
creditor, since they are more vulnerable to greater harm in these circumstances. But of course this is not
equally true of all employees. It is not obvious that computer engineers, software designers, commercial
lawyers, and others with scarce skills are in need of the same protection as unskilled workers. And one
Information Technology expert might be much better placed to deal with the insolvency of his employer
than another, perhaps because the former is younger and therefore considered more (re-)employable in
that young industry.

But it makes sense nevertheless to treat all of them the same, simply because it would be too
expensive to require the liquidator to investigate the relative positions of all the claimants in terms of
vulnerability to serious detriment. What is more, it would be next to impossible for him to determine
whether a particular employee was more vulnerable than others in this insolvency because, for example,
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he had been less cautious in planning for such a contingency than all the others, or because he had more
expensive tastes for consumables like holidays, etc.135 Most liquidators asked to embark upon such an
exercise would necessarily exhaust all available assets along the way, and no one would get anything.
Apart from being inefficient, wastage of this nature does not lead to fairness either. Again, then,
“equality” is resorted to because the costs of employing any more appropriate method of distribution
(including one which is fairer in the abstract) would outweigh its benefits.136

The third manifestation of formal equality has already been mentioned. Preferential claims are
also treated “equally” inter se. It is interesting to note that even here, the reason behind this seems to be
exactly the same. Notionally, of course, employees and the Crown are the two types of preferential
claimant. But the employees of an insolvent firm, in recognition of their especially vulnerable position,
have been accorded rights which -- in their capacity as creditors -- make them almost unconcerned
about their employer’s insolvency. This is because of the provisions of what is now the Employment
Rights Act 1996 (ERA). This regime “provides for different and generally more extensive protection
for an employee than under the Insolvency Act”.137 Under it, the Secretary of State, through the
Redundancy Payment Service, makes payments to employees from the National Insurance Fund. The
ERA scheme covers (inter alia) up to eight weeks of unpaid wages and salaries, wages during the
statutory minimum notice period, up to six weeks of holiday pay, and a basic award for unfair dismissal.
These payments are likely to be larger than those given preferential status by the Insolvency Act. For
the payments made, the Secretary of State is subrogated to the employees’ rights.138

Relevant to our discussion is the fact that, “once employees’ rights under ERA are factored into
the overall picture..., the Crown, by subrogation, takes over the claims of employees in a very large
proportion of cases and is often the sole preferential creditor”.139 Again, then, we have an excellent
explanation (though historically perhaps a partial one) for the fact that preferential claims rank equally
amongst themselves. Most of these claims are held by the same actor, the Crown. So again it would
simply be pointless to provide for different priorities for these claims. Why expend resources
differentiating these claims both ex ante and ex post, when in most cases any such differentiation would
merely be notional? It is submitted that this provides further support for the proposition that formal
equality in insolvency law (including that enshrined in the pari passu rule) is resorted to only when the
costs of providing otherwise would outweigh the benefits. It is for this reason that the pari passu
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principle is best regarded as a fall-back provision. It is submitted that it plays no other role in
insolvency distributions.140

Finally, it should be pointed out that even if analytically accurate, the arguments made in this
Section are incomplete from a historical perspective. To meet this apparent deficiency, here is one
hypothesis. The search costs for ascertaining optimum rankings for different types of claim depend
either on the availability of a theory of finance, or on a process of trial-error-adjustment by the parties
themselves. When the former method is unavailable or underdeveloped, the time component of search
costs (incurred during trial-error-adjustment) is high. So initially, only the more obvious methods of
distribution (e.g. pari passu), and of bargaining for priority (e.g. rudimentary forms of security), which
have therefore been developed earlier and employed for longer, would be cost-effective. So after 1543,
when statute first provided for claims against bankrupts to be paid in “a portion rate and rate like,
according to the quantity of their debt”,141 this initially might in fact have been a rule of almost
universal application, perhaps only secured and Crown claims being exempt.142 Again, this would have
been so not because Parliament and the parties themselves at that time were fairer than they are now,
but simply because no better method of distribution had then been discovered (i.e. none was costeffective). But as better (fairer and more efficient) methods were discovered both through trial-erroradjustment and the development of theories of finance, pari passu would quickly be relegated to a mere
fall-back provision even as applied to unsecured claims.

This hypothesis predicts that unless all creditors in real life are truly equal in all relevant
respects, there would always be an increasing tendency for a fair and efficient insolvency law system to
develop different priorities for different types of claim, to the full extent of all the assets generally
available in liquidation. This then implies that attempts to “equalise” distributions to creditors who are
different in relevant respects are thoroughly misguided, since they impede the development of a fairer
and more efficient system.

7. THE REMOVAL OF TAX CLAIMS PREFERENCES
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The analysis in the previous Section allows us to examine the Government’s recent proposal to remove
the preferential status enjoyed by certain tax claims (discussed above).143 The proposal is conceived as
“an important and integral part” of a package of reforms to corporate insolvency law, which also
includes the abolition of administrative receivership and changes to the administration procedure to
make it more “streamlined”, and thus the successor to receivership.144 The White Paper suggests that in
insolvencies where there is a floating charge, a certain proportion of the funds generated by assets
subject to it would be “ringfenced” to ensure the benefit of the proposed change goes to unsecured
creditors rather than to the charge-holder.145 The Government predicts that the removal of tax claim
preferences will bring “major benefits to trade and other unsecured creditors, including small
businesses”.146 Importantly, however, the “preferential status of certain claims by employees in
insolvency proceedings... within certain limits [also discussed above] will remain, as will the rights of
those subrogated to them”.147 It will be argued in this Section that the proposal to remove the
preferential status of tax claims is unlikely to bring any significant benefit to unsecured creditors, and
thus does not fulfil its stated objective. In addition, the proposal is incoherent.

In order to evaluate the proposal, we should begin by trying to estimate the quantum of the
additional benefits to unsecured creditors which can be expected to result from its implementation.
Even a very rough estimate requires a lengthy calculation, and because of the imprecision of the data
available, the estimate here will indeed be rough. But it will soon become apparent that this does not
matter to the point being made here. Unless otherwise stated, any doubts in the figures are resolved so
as to maximise the expected additional benefit to unsecured creditors from the proposed change.

At the moment, total liabilities of companies that undergo a formal insolvency procedure during
a year are estimated to be about £42b.148 Of this, about 35% is owed to banks.149 Let us suppose that
80% of bank debt is secured by the company’s assets.150 So secured creditors are owed, roughly, 28%
of the total outstanding debt. Preferential creditors get back about 30% of what they are owed.151 The
amount actually paid out as dividends in right of tax claims preferences is around £100m.152 So
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preferential tax claims themselves amount to some £333m. The amount owed in right of employee
preferences is an estimated £200m.153 Altogether, then, preferential debts constitute about 1.3% of the
total debts owed by insolvent companies. It follows that unsecured creditors are owed about 70.7% of
the total outstanding debt of companies in insolvency proceedings. This amounts to around £29.69b.
They get an average of 7 pence on the pound,154 or about £2.1b (£2100m) today.

Now the Government estimates that the removal of tax claims preferences would bring "up to"
£100m more for unsecured creditors.155 So after the removal of preferential status for tax claims,
unsecured creditors will get £2200m.156 In other words, their recoveries would go up to 7.4% once the
proposal in implemented. This is of course an increase of less than one-half of one penny over what
they currently get! And that does not take into account that all tax claims would then also rank
alongside other unsecured claims.157

It should be obvious, then, that even if these calculations are wide of the mark (so that the actual
increase will be twice, thrice, or even five times this much), the average recovery rates for unsecured
creditors in an overwhelming majority of formal insolvency proceedings are unlikely to go up to the
extent that such creditors would be appreciably better off. The Government’s claim that this “important
and integral” part of its reform package will bring “major benefits” to them therefore seems simply
unsustainable. In addition, and in line with the analysis in the previous Sections, the reader should note
that it makes very obvious sense to subject to the pari passu rule the tiny additional sums which will
become available in many formal insolvency proceedings because of the proposed change. For these
additional sums, it would be entirely wasteful to attempt to think up some other set of priorities. The
costs of doing that would be quite unjustified in view of the size of the expected benefits.
So much for the suggestion that the proposal is likely to be inefficacious. To understand why it is
incoherent, we should recall that because of the rights of employee-creditors of insolvent companies
under the ERA, the claims apparently held by them and given preferential status, are mostly vested in
the Crown by way of subrogation. So preferential tax claims and preferential ‘employee’ claims are in
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most cases held by the same actor. Nor does this fact go unnoticed in the White Paper. As already
mentioned, the Paper not only states that certain employee claims will retain their preferential status,
but also explicitly includes within this reservation “the rights of those subrogated to them”,158 or in
other words, of the Crown itself. Now the supposed rationale for removing the preferential status of tax
claims is presumably the well-rehearsed one that the Crown is better able to absorb the loss of not being
paid by some of its debtors, than are some other categories of creditor, for example, weak trade
creditors.159 But if this is accepted, it surely follows that ‘employee’ claims, also generally held by the
Crown, should lose their preferential status for exactly the same reason. Employees might deserve
greater protection in their employer’s insolvency than other types of claimant, but if they have already
been reimbursed from the National Insurance Fund, then the competition is no longer between them and
other unsecured creditors, but between the latter and the Crown. So there seems little sense in
suggesting reform to only one category of preferential claims, when the reason why that reform is
considered desirable is equally a reason to change the other category as well. This is especially relevant
given that the stated aim of improving the prospects of unsecured creditors is expected to be fulfilled to
a negligible degree in any case.160

At the very least, the Government bears the burden of showing what makes preferential tax
claims different from most preferential ‘employee’ claims. One way in which it might attempt to do so
would be to provide better data than is currently available, and thus rebut the premise of this argument,
that the Crown holds, by subrogation, most preferential ‘employee’ claims. But even then, the obvious
solution would be to adopt the approach enshrined in the US Bankruptcy Code, which provides that an
entity subrogated to the rights of, inter alia, the employee-creditors of a bankrupt company, is not
entitled to enjoy the statutory preferential status provided to some of their claims.161 This would ensure
that the preferential status of ‘employee’ debts was retained only to the extent that employees
themselves would benefit from it. Unless the Government explains why this is unacceptable, it seems
difficult to avoid the conclusion that its proposal is based on an arbitrary and thus unjustifiable
distinction.

8. CONCLUSION

Some years ago, Bridge concluded his brief review of the clash between pari passu distribution on the
one hand, and the freedom of contract which allows parties to grant and take security on the other, by
framing the issue thus: “Is the pari passu principle so strong that the burden of proving efficiency rests
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upon those who support secured credit, or is freedom of contract paramount so that the burden falls
upon those who oppose security?”162 Even without invoking freedom of contract,163 here (it is
submitted) is the answer. The first premise of those attacking the priority accorded to secured claims -that unequal treatment of claims is anomalous, somehow a deviation from the “strong” “equality” norm
-- is quite false. If anything, it is the pari passu principle which constitutes an isolated enclave of
“equality” in a (formally) unequal insolvency world. In that real world, its status -- considered as a rule
governing distribution of assets -- hovers somewhere between falsehood and tautology. So with respect,
assertions that this principle is all-pervasive in the liquidation regime, that it underlies some of the bestknown avoidance provisions of that regime, or that it provides the only alternative to an undesirable
free-for-all, all stand rebutted as based on a fallacy. They must all be abandoned. So must the argument
that the pari passu principle is necessary to ensure fairness in liquidation.

It is submitted that it is the critics of differing priorities for different types of claim, including
those attacking the full priority of secured claims, who must now be on the defensive, at least on these
grounds. The general rule in insolvency law, its deeply-embedded norm, seems to be that the assets
available in insolvent estates are to be distributed “unequally”, unless attempting to do so would be
pointless because wasteful. It might be that the different priorities afforded to different types of
claimant are sometimes arbitrary. It might be that this area of the law could do with extensive rethinking and rationalisation. Even then, it would not follow that what should replace the current system
is one which crudely equalises all creditors in their debtor’s insolvency. Formal equality of that sort is
not the natural alternative. It will not win by default. Not only is it rare and unnecessary in the real
world, it is also useless as an ideal. So it must be argued for as much as any other system of priorities
proposed as a replacement for the current one, and it would be at least as contentious as any of them.
Those arguing for (a more) “equal” treatment of all claims must therefore bear the heavy burden of
showing why moves towards formal equality are desirable.
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